Strong Warning from Joint Sword-2024B Exercises
Luo Ching-sheng, China Times Commentary, October 18, 2024
The anticipated People’s Liberation Army (PLA) "Joint Sword-2024B" military exercise took place as scheduled but concluded unexpectedly within a single day. This signals a political message to the United States, the administration of President Lai Ching-te, and the people of Taiwan, which has been widely interpreted. This article focuses on the military strategic implications.
First, while the PLA exercises aim to intimidate Taiwan, they consistently introduce new elements, advancing their strategy. As Navy Commander Tang Hua noted in an interview with The Economist, the PLA is employing a "python strategy" to tighten its grip on Taiwan. These exercises are not isolated incidents but part of a continuous campaign that gradually escalates pressure on Taiwan. Previously, the PLA operated only west of the Taiwan Strait median line; now, their vessels are frequently spotted near Taiwan, visible to fishermen.
Second, the most significant development in this exercise is the increased maritime police presence "patrolling around Taiwan." Seventeen coast guard ships surrounded the Taiwan Strait, with some continuing their patrols post-exercise, potentially establishing a "new normal." This is the crux of the recent drills. The presence of mainland Chinese coast guard vessels not only indicates actual control over the waters but also suggests that any future blockade of Taiwan may rely on coast guard isolation rather than a traditional military blockade akin to the "Cuban Missile Crisis."
For decades, the methods the PLA might use against Taiwan have been a major focus for Taiwanese military strategists. The military has outlined various scenarios for a potential attack, ranging from the least aggressive blockade to the most intense amphibious invasion, with corresponding contingency plans. Recently, U.S. strategic scholars have introduced concepts like asymmetric warfare and urban combat into defense discussions, but they generally remain within this spectrum. However, a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) introduced the "gray zone" strategy, which is particularly relevant to the "Joint Sword-2024B" exercises.
According to the CSIS report, China could use its coast guard to impose comprehensive or localized isolation on Taiwan, disrupting access to ports and essential supplies. This gray zone tactic, lying between war and peace, significantly complicates countermeasures for the United States and other democracies.
The report describes this type of action as "isolation," executed by law enforcement agencies like the coast guard, which manages maritime or air traffic in specific areas, distinguishing it from military "blockades" considered acts of war. This poses a dilemma for the United States because if American forces intervene in what China claims are law enforcement activities, it may be perceived as an aggressive military action.
This approach appears to draw from mainland China's tactics in the Diaoyutai Islands and South China Sea, where coast guard vessels patrol to assert control over contested waters and deny others' sovereignty claims. The report emphasizes that while much attention is given to the threat of invasion, Beijing has multiple options to coerce, punish, or annex Taiwan beyond direct military action.
If this is the case, then Taiwan's preparations for "anti-isolation" measures are woefully inadequate. The military's readiness strategies—including preserving combat power, striking at sources, targeting amphibious assault fleets, coastal defenses, and deep operations—along with significant resource investments and ammunition stockpiles, as well as the resilience of 400,000 militia members, may all prove futile. Taiwan could find itself helplessly watching as it is isolated. While essential goods like food might not be restricted under humanitarian concerns, imports and exports would cease, leading to economic paralysis.
Can the Taiwanese military use missiles, submarines, or naval vessels to target coast guard ships? No, because coast guard operations are law enforcement, not military action. Attacking coast guard vessels could raise concerns about violations of international law. The U.S. military cannot do this, and neither can Taiwan's military.
The "Joint Sword-2024B" exercise clearly demonstrated that PLA naval ships are deployed near all coast guard formations. If a coast guard ship is attacked, the PLA can retaliate immediately under the guise of "self-defense."
This could even be seen as a trap. International consensus holds that the party that fires the first shot gains the right to self-defense, which legitimizes their military action. Taiwan can only respond with its coast guard. However, Taiwan's largest coast guard vessels weigh only 4,000 tons, while mainland Chinese coast guard ships exceed 10,000 tons. Claiming that Taiwan's coast guard can "drive away" significantly larger mainland vessels is self-deceptive.
This is not intended to be disrespectful, but from a strategic perspective, President Lai's "preparing for war to avoid war" theory is flawed. Taiwan lacks sufficient strength and must view "preparation" and "avoidance" as two wings of security, not gamble solely on one. The warning from the "Joint Sword-2024B" exercises is clear and strong: With the use of coast guard "patrol control around Taiwan," the "python strategy" is nearing its final stage. The risk of continued cross-strait confrontation is growing. If the PLA seizes the next opportunity for military exercises, what further step will coast guard patrol control take? Taiwan must remain vigilant.
(The author is the executive director of the Taiwan Institute for National Strategy.)
Photo from: China Times
Article from: https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20241018000644-260118?chdtv