U.S. Defense Strategy Shifts Reflect Changing Stance on Taiwan
China Times Editorial, January 27, 2026
The administration of President Donald Trump in the United States has successively released policy documents on national security and defense, signaling a strategic “paradigm shift.” China is no longer portrayed as an “imminent challenge or threat” to the United States, and Taiwan’s security issues are deliberately decoupled. His meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping planned for April will be a critical moment determining U.S.–China relations and the situation in the Taiwan Strait, with American scholars and experts repeatedly issuing warnings. By contrast, the only policy option for President Lai Ching-te’s administration is to cling tightly to the United States, yet even after paying sky-high protection fees, it still cannot obtain Trump’s favor.
On January 23, the U.S. Department of War released its National Defense Strategy report, whose tone aligns with the earlier National Security Strategy issued by the White House. What has drawn media attention is its increasingly conciliatory stance toward China, with the two key words “Taiwan” and “democracy” completely absent. The former suggests that, in Mr. Trump’s eyes, Taiwan amounts only to its advanced semiconductor industry, with security being none of his concern; the latter reflects that, in transactional diplomacy, the values of freedom and democracy have long been shelved. Most contradictory and ironic is that the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) core diplomatic appeal shows a serious disconnect with Mr. Trump’s foreign policy philosophy, yet all hope continues to be placed in an illusory American protection.
A review of the Trump administration’s national security and defense strategy reports shows that protecting the U.S. homeland and Western Hemisphere interests is the top priority, followed by deterring China in the Indo-Pacific through strength rather than conflict. This marks a departure from Mr. Trump’s first term and the Biden administration, which prioritized countering China above all else. The Trump administration has repeatedly emphasized that the United States does not seek to dominate China, nor to contain or humiliate it; “de-conflictization” and “reducing tensions” have become the shared language of U.S.–China dialogue, with China redefined as an “economic competitor” rather than an ideological enemy.
Regarding Taiwan, since taking office, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has repeatedly warned that any Chinese attempt to conquer Taiwan by force would lead to devastating consequences. Yet this National Defense Strategy report makes no mention of Taiwan at all, highlighting the accelerating shift in the American stance on the Taiwan issue. For decades, the Taiwan Relations Act and the “Six Assurances” were standard language in U.S. policy toward Taiwan; now they have fallen silent. “Trump 2.0” retreats even further than strategic ambiguity.
Mr. Trump recently stated publicly that he is not worried about China’s “Justice Mission-2025” encirclement exercises around Taiwan. He also said he believes Taiwan being part of China is a source of pride for Mr. Xi, and that if he decided to attack Taiwan, Mr. Trump would be very unhappy. After the conclusion of U.S.-Taiwan negotiations, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Lutnick bluntly stated, “Taiwan must make our president happy, right? Because our president is the key to protection.”
From both policy and action perspectives, in Mr. Trump’s eyes Taiwan’s real value lies in its advanced semiconductor industry and its geographic position along the first island chain, which can be used as bargaining chips in exchange for security. As 40 percent of Taiwan’s semiconductor capacity moves to the United States and America achieves its goal of “chip independence,” Taiwan’s strategic value—and the risk the United States would take to fight for Taiwan—declines accordingly.
New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof published an opinion piece harshly criticizing Mr. Trump’s overly passive attitude toward the potential risk of war in the Taiwan Strait, warning that it could increase the likelihood of Beijing taking risky actions against Taiwan. Sun Yun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, published an article titled “A Perfect Storm for Taiwan in 2026?” in Foreign Affairs, warning that the convergence of many factors has emboldened Beijing. The national security reports’ tilt toward “non-interventionism,” Mr. Trump being the least concerned U.S. president about Taiwan, and his low likelihood of military intervention in a Taiwan Strait conflict all lead Beijing to view this as a rare opportunity.
Harvard University professor Graham Allison, who formulated the “Thucydides Trap,” has indicated that both the United States and China view President Lai Ching-te and his promotion of “incremental Taiwan independence” as a threat. During Mr. Trump’s term, a “Fourth U.S.–China Communiqué” may emerge, and its binding force could be stronger than previous ones. On the eve of the Trump–Xi meeting, various unfavorable signs are appearing; even if the perfect storm does not break out immediately, it is clearly accelerating in the making.
Yet the Lai administration, trapped at the center of the storm, refuses to abandon a pragmatic Taiwan-independence line to improve cross-strait relations. Domestically, it cannot escape the predicament of dual minorities and instead intensifies partisan confrontation. At present, beyond masking governmental incompetence and anesthetizing the public, its only option is to place its hopes in the United States. Thus, from relocating the semiconductor supply chain to the United States, to raising defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030, to a NT$1.25 trillion (about US$39.8 billion) special defense budget, and unquestioningly complying with American demands, President Lai has even used his presidential authority to echo the claim by Director Raymond Greene of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) that “freedom is not free” to pressure the opposition. Yet this still fails to win Mr. Trump’s favor, as approval for President Lai’s transit through the United States has yet to be granted.
With flawed strategic design, misjudgment of the situation, and a singular focus on preserving DPP rule, the Lai administration has pushed Taiwan into a vicious cycle. Trump’s cold attitude leaves open the possibility of using Taiwan as a bargaining chip, while Mr. Xi actively advances the unification agenda. As one side rises and the other falls, mainland China gains greater voice and initiative. Relying on the United States does not equate to protecting Taiwan. If the DPP continues to refuse to face reality, Taiwan will find it difficult to escape a fate of abandonment and domination.
From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20260127003816-262101?chdtv