Stepping Up Resistance to China: President Lai and Trump Diverge
China Times Editorial, November 27, 2025
An opinion piece by President Lai Ching-te was recently published in The Washington Post, declaring that Taiwan will significantly increase its defense budget, promote all-people defense, strengthen asymmetric warfare, and explicitly position Taiwan on the front line of resisting Beijing’s hegemony. In terms of domestic political effect, the op-ed does allow supporters to see that “we are brave,” while conveying to the international community Taiwan’s posture of “never yielding.”
However, when this opinion is viewed in the context of the latest U.S.-China-Japan interactions, it instead highlights an awkward reality: while Taipei is turning the volume to maximum, President Donald Trump of the United States, who actually holds diplomatic and military decision-making power, is deliberately turning it down. This dissonance raises a curious question: the Lai administration relies heavily on the United States, but is it actually drifting farther away from Trump?
Shortly after his call with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Mr. Trump phoned Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan. According to media reports, Mr. Trump clearly asked Ms. Takaichi to “tone down” toward China and refrain from taking excessively tough or provocative positions in China relations. Whether this was a friendly reminder or pressure-laden advice, it shows at least one thing: Mr. Trump does not want his Asian allies to add fuel to the fire in their China policy at this moment—he wants de-escalation.
While Washington urges Tokyo to keep a low profile, Taipei has chosen to dramatically increase its volume in international media, creating a very delicate contrast. It is undeniable that for certain hawkish members of the U.S. Congress, President Lai’s op-ed carries political value—they can use it as evidence to claim that Taiwan is brave and determined, and further demand that the United States “must not abandon a democratic ally.” But real diplomatic and military decisions are made by the White House and Department of State, not by lawmakers whose main task is appealing to voters. In other words, Taiwan’s high-profile posture may satisfy the narrative needs of Washington’s hawks but make Taiwan issues even harder for the U.S. executive branch to manage.
American experts familiar with Taiwan affairs like Ryan Hass, have repeatedly reminded Taiwan in recent months that under a Trump-led environment, it should remain even more low-key. The reason is simple: Mr. Trump has little interest in a “democracy versus authoritarianism” contest; what he cares about is whether he can strike a major deal with Mr. Xi that benefits himself. He will instinctively resist any variable that could disrupt U.S.–China relations or undermine his planned visit to China next year. If Taiwan deliberately heightens its confrontational posture at this moment, then it could easily be seen by Trump as a source of instability for U.S.-China relations, rather than a partner that stabilizes the situation.
What is more concerning is that President Lai not only emphasizes keywords such as “strengthening defense,” “all-people defense,” and “resisting Beijing’s hegemony” through the op-ed, but also continues using the rhetoric of “asymmetric warfare,” conveying to the public the impression that “victory is possible as long as we are prepared.” The problem is that this narrative carries a serious cognitive risk.
If Taiwan is truly preparing for the worst-case scenario, then several things must be made clear to the public. First, asymmetric warfare is not a cure-all. “Turning Taiwan into a porcupine” may sound vivid, but a porcupine is not actually a deterrent creature. The core function of asymmetric capabilities is to raise the adversary’s cost of using force and delay the onset of war—not to guarantee that “we can win.” Without substantive U.S. military aid and logistical support, asymmetric strategies can at most buy time and increase costs, but are unlikely to reverse battlefield outcomes.
Second, American and Japanese support for Taiwan is not a treaty-based guarantee of military intervention. The United States today is extremely cautious about going to war for others; and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces—both legally and in terms of capability—are far less able to intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict than many in Taiwan public discourse imagine.
Furthermore, the government emphasizes that Taiwan is no longer economically dependent on the mainland, but such “decoupling” claims do not align with reality. Cross-strait trade still accounts for about 30 percent of Taiwan’s total foreign trade. Claiming political decoupling while the industrial structure remains deeply interconnected places Taiwan in a state of self-contradiction and weakens its ability to adjust to external risks.
While Taiwan speaks loudly against the mainland, U.S.-China dialogue on Taiwan has become more direct, with the bottom lines of both sides clearer. Ms. Takaichi’s recent remarks on Taiwan have already drawn stern warnings from Beijing. If Taiwan continues treating “relying on allies and escalating anti-China actions” as its basic approach, then the risk does not decrease—it increases dramatically. Do not forget: President George W. Bush once publicly criticized Taiwan for “provoking China and undermining stability.” Whether Washington today may again view Taiwan as a troublemaker and distance itself is a matter that warrants caution.
National security is not achieved through slogans, nor is deterrence a game of bluffing—it relies on strength, social unity, and a keen, measured reading of international dynamics. If a leader seeks only to mark his place on the political spectrum but refuses to take a far-sighted, comprehensive approach, then Taiwan is not moving toward greater space but inching closer to the brink of conflict. President Lai must understand: calling for peace does not mean surrender, moderation is not cowardice, and willingness to hit the brakes is not unpatriotic—it is what allows Taiwan to move further and more safely.
From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20251127004822-262101?chdtv