State Report Is Constitutional, Legislative Yuan Can Surely Oversee President
The Storm Media Editorial, May 16, 2024
With the presidential inauguration on May 20 approaching, the Legislative Yuan is abuzz with discussions on parliamentary reform, with a primary focus on how the president should deliver his State of the Nation report to the Legislative Yuan. Amidst the political tussle, "unconstitutional" has become a key term, while the position of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) caucus that the president is not subject to Legislative Yuan supervision has drawn attention.
First, having the president deliver a national state report to the Legislative Yuan, regardless of whether the president responds to legislators' suggestions or how those responses are given, does not constitute a constitutional violation. Second, in a democratic system, no official, regardless of rank, is beyond oversight, including the president.
The Additional Articles of the Constitution explicitly state that the Legislative Yuan "may hear a report on the state of the nation by the president” when it convenes each year. The procedures for such a report are outlined in the Act Governing the Exercise of Powers of the Legislative Yuan, which allows the Legislative Yuan to initiate an invitation or the president to request to deliver the report. The Act also stipulates that after legislators speak, a supplementary report may be provided with the president's consent. In other words, there is no constitutional issue regardless of how legislators make suggestions or how those suggestions are responded to; the concern is merely about adherence to the Act Governing the Exercise of Powers of the Legislative Yuan.
Lai Should Follow Lee’s Example of Listening and Responding
Prior to the constitutional amendments, neither the Temporary Provisions during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion nor the original Constitution required the president to listen to national policy advice from National Assembly representatives. However, former President Lee Teng-hui, who prided himself on being a leader with "the people's desires in his heart," proactively sought such advice and responded comprehensively, often multiple times. The late president never restricted the scope of advice to "national policies" alone, understanding that after the supplementary elections of National Assembly representatives, grassroots representatives inevitably reflected local public opinion. The president could choose to respond or refer issues to administrative agencies for further deliberation. After the dissolution of the National Assembly, the responsibility to hear the president’s state report naturally shifted to the sole remaining legislative body, the Legislative Yuan.
The preliminary consensus reached in cross-party negotiations suggests a speaking order and ratio of two seats for the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), nine seats each for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), with each speaker allocated six minutes. Both the KMT and TPP have agreed to a unified question-and-answer format. The details of this format, such as whether it will be three speakers from each party, one unified response per party, or a comprehensive reply after all twenty legislators have spoken, can be decided by the president on the spot or through prior cross-party negotiations.
With this agenda in place, President-elect Lai Ching-te, regardless of how many rounds of responses he chooses to give, along with the opening speech (national state report), could conclude the session in four to five hours. If proceedings go smoothly, this would take no more than half a day. Using half a day to become the first president to deliver a state report to the Legislative Yuan following constitutional amendments is certainly worthwhile.
The debate over whether offering advice and responding constitutes "question and answer" is purely semantic and not worth the contention between the president-elect and legislators. Offering advice inherently involves the possibility of questioning; legislators can present their comprehensive national policy proposals for the president's consideration or express skepticism about the President-elect's national direction. The core of their skepticism lies in the hope that the President-elect will make adjustments. In other words, questioning is also a form of offering advice.
As a former legislator, Lai understands the diverse and imaginative nature of legislative inquiries. Not responding doesn't imply a lack of ideas; responding indicates definite thoughts. Answering legislators' advice demonstrates a commitment to public opinion. Like Lee, who chose to respond even when not constitutionally mandated, Lai should embrace this approach. As a minority president, Lai should show leadership by engaging with public opinion in the legislature rather than staying confined within his office.
Legislative Yuan's Power to Impeach or Recall the President is Oversight
The only concern regarding the interaction between legislators and the president’s state report is the potential for blurring the lines of accountability between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan. However, with only 20 legislators (less than one-fifth of the total) offering advice, this concern is minimized. Moreover, with a unified question-and-answer format, the risk is further reduced. The notion that "the Legislative Yuan cannot supervise the president" is not a valid argument against this practice, as the issue of oversight is not relevant in this context.
Although the Constitution of the Republic of China may be considered a "patchwork vehicle," its oversight and checks and balances mechanisms remain comprehensive. Despite the longstanding debate over whether the government should adopt a presidential or parliamentary system, the core of democratic politics is supervision and checks and balances. Originally, the Constitution divided the powers of the National Assembly into three parts: the Executive Yuan was accountable to the Legislative Yuan, the president was accountable to the National Assembly, and the Control Yuan was responsible for impeachment. This effectively meant that two bodies could oversee the president.
After constitutional amendments, the National Assembly was abolished, and the power to hear state reports was transferred to the Legislative Yuan. The method of selecting members of the Control Yuan was changed, diminishing the role of the National Assembly. The right to investigate, previously held by the National Assembly, was also transferred to the Legislative Yuan, as was the power to impeach the president. Additionally, the Legislative Yuan gained the power to recall the president. Thus, the Legislative Yuan can propose impeachment cases against the president and vice president. Therefore, to say that "the Legislative Yuan cannot supervise the president" is incorrect. Rather, it is more accurate to say that supervising the president through the Legislative Yuan is challenging and requires significant effort. Impeachment cases must be sent to the Constitutional Court and recall cases must be put to a nationwide vote. Nonetheless, the initial mechanism of oversight lies within the Legislative Yuan.
During his presidential campaign, Lai mistakenly stated that "the Republic of China is a disaster," later clarifying that he meant "the Constitution of the Republic of China is a disaster." The Constitution itself is not a disaster, but as a patchwork vehicle that has undergone numerous amendments, it has become increasingly fragmented. Moreover, when politicians prioritize party interests and power calculations, using "unconstitutional" as a shield for administrative abuse or as an excuse for the Legislative Yuan to self-impose restrictions, it will truly become a disaster for democracy.