Overtones from Biden-Xi Meeting：Why Did Xi Deny Plans to Invade Taiwan in 2027 or 2023？
By Deng Fong
China Times, November 18, 2023
During the highly anticipated meeting between President Joe Biden of the United States and Chinese President Xi Jinping, Taiwan remained an important focal point. According to mainland Chinese state media reports, Mr. Xi pointed out that Taiwan has always been the most significant and sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. Furthermore, the United States should enact its disagreement with Taiwan’s independence in concrete actions, cease its arming of Taiwan, and support China’s peaceful reunification. According to Mr. Xi, China will eventually achieve reunification; it is inevitable.
Voice of America cited an anonymous senior official who stated that Mr. Xi explicitly expressed Beijing’s desire for peaceful reunification, but then immediately outlined conditions under which the use of force might be considered. In response, Biden categorically stated that the longstanding U.S. position is committed to maintaining peace and stability. The United States insists on maintaining the status quo and demands that China respect Taiwan’s electoral process. Mr. Xi, however, stated that although peace is preferable, there will come a time when China must move towards a comprehensive resolution. The official noted that Mr. Xi said he heard various reports from the United States saying that China is planning military action in 2027 or 2035. According to the official, Mr. Xi basically said that there is no such plan, and no one has informed him of such a plan.
Xi Denies Plans to Attack Taiwan
If the reports from Voice of America are accurate, this should be Mr. Xi’s first public mention and denial of U.S. allegations concerning Chinese military plans against Taiwan in 2027 or 2035. In recent years, due to the deteriorating situation in the Taiwan Strait, some voices in the United States have speculated that China is considering taking military actions against Taiwan in the coming years, with 2027 or 2035 being potential timeframes.
For example, in 2021, then-U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Philip Davidson predicted that China might attack Taiwan within six years (that is, before 2027). Earlier this year, U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Mike Minihan stated, in a memo to subordinate officers, that the United States might enter conflict with China in 2025, with the most likely cause being the Taiwan issue. He suggested that in 2024, both the United States and Taiwan would hold elections, providing an opportunity for the mainland to attempt to resolve the Taiwan issue. However, this speculation was never confirmed by China; now, Mr. Xi has come forward to deny such speculations.
What does this indicate? Does it mean mainland China will refrain from military action against Taiwan in the coming years? Will the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan consequently feel emboldened?
Mr. Xi’s statements must be contextualized within the consistent mainland Chinese policy towards Taiwan since the era of reform and opening up. In terms of intentions and objectives, Beijing unequivocally does not want to see armed conflict across the strait; its society genuinely desires a peaceful resolution to cross-strait issues. Despite increasing dissatisfaction with Taiwan independence in mainland Chinese society in recent years, the majority of mainland Chinese people still consider the Taiwanese as Chinese, and they still endorse the compatriotic sentiment of “Chinese people do not fight against Chinese people.” A peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue is the least costly and least burdensome ideal solution, aligning with the overall interests of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan is a core concern in mainland China’s external relations and a “top priority” in safeguarding China’s national interests. But it is not the most urgent or critical task on the agenda. The fundamental concern for Beijing is regime security, and the highest concern is the rejuvenation and modernization of the Chinese nation. Both entities require social stability, economic development, and improvement of people’s livelihoods as prerequisites. From the mainland’s perspective, resolving the Taiwan issue is a necessary component of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, but it is by no means the primary one, as the mainland with its population of 1.4 billion people comprises the main body of the nation.
Therefore, mainland China will strive for cross-strait reunification as much as possible without jeopardizing regime security, social stability, economic development, and improvement of people’s livelihoods, so that the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is not left in uncertainty due to unresolved Taiwan issues. However, Beijing will not excessively elevate and ideologize the Taiwan issue, nor will the mainland affect the overall situation of the national body solely for the sake of resolving the Taiwan issue.
Acts to Deter Taiwan Independence Not Equal to Reunification by Military Force
From the perspective of mainland China’s overall development, a peaceful and stable environment remains a top priority. Seizing the window of opportunity to comprehensively develop the economy and technology; continuously improving people’s lives; and significantly enhancing comprehensive national strength have been their fundamental strategies since the era of reform and opening up. Thus, unless it is absolutely necessary under extreme circumstances, Beijing will continue to pursue peaceful reunification as the goal for resolving cross-strait issues. As for military pressure and the “non-committal to renouncing the use of force,” these are objective measures to deter Taiwan independence under the current circumstances and are pressure tactics that the mainland feels compelled to take in order to preserve the opportunity for development.
As long as the internal and external situations allow, mainland China’s policy towards Taiwan will continue to be a dual-track approach: using Taiwan independence as a bottom line to maintain and promoting reunification as a goal to move toward. From Beijing’s perspective, reunification will be a process that cannot be accomplished overnight, but opposition to Taiwan independence must be upheld at all times. In different periods, due to differences in political environments and social atmospheres, the mainland’s approach and methods of using this dual-track strategy may vary.
From the perspective of the overall interests of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, maintaining peaceful and stable cross-strait relations is a necessary precondition for achieving an ideal solution to the Taiwan issue in the future. This requires both sides to exercise restraint against narrow and radical populist sentiments and to remain clear-headed and rational. These lessons, whether from the context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict or the Israel-Hamas conflict, are lessons that both sides of the Taiwan Strait should learn from.
Considering the respective situations across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwanese society should understand that mainland China’s intention and goal are peaceful reunification, but if Beijing’s red line is crossed, a significant situation recognized by the Anti-Secession Law that requires “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” to manage will inevitably trigger a strong mainland Chinese countermeasure, which would not be in the mainland’s interest, nor would Taiwan be able to bear the consequences.
When Mr. Xi tells Mr. Biden that “China will eventually achieve reunification; it is inevitable,” he is actually sending a strong signal—mainland Chinese efforts to counter Taiwan independence and promote reunification will intensify in the future. This means that Beijing will adopt a more assertive and resolute stance against Taiwan independence while making greater efforts to promote reunification.
Therefore, Mr. Xi’s denial of military action against Taiwan in 2027 or 2035 reflects that mainland China still considers a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue as the goal. However, many things in the world are conditional and subject to internal and external circumstances. Whether there can be an ideal solution to the Taiwan issue that aligns with the well-being of people on both sides of the strait is contingent on whether cross-strait relations can swiftly return to a state of peace and stability, and this is the most pressing matter at hand.
From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20231117005275-262110?chdtv