Mainland China Has No Option to Annex Taiwan

Want Times, Featured Editorial, May 1, 2025

At the symposium marking the 20th anniversary of the “Lien-Hu Meeting,” Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia of the Kuomintang (KMT) stated that historical experience shows that as long as both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area—both of which define cross-strait relations as “one China” rather than state-to-state—then the use of non-peaceful means as outlined in mainland China’s Anti-Secession Law would not apply. His remarks sharply exposed the blind spot in the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) anti-China narrative.

The ruling DPP argues that Beijing’s ultimate goal is to annex Taiwan and build its cross-strait narrative around confrontation. According to this logic, all mainland-hosted “cross-strait exchanges” are deemed united front efforts aimed at infiltrating and controlling Taiwan and must, therefore, be resisted.

Moreover, the mainland’s stance of “not renouncing the use of force” is viewed as a plan to invade, occupy, and destroy the R.O.C. The DPP insists Taiwan must prepare for war and seek international support, or risk repeating historical tragedies like the February 28 Incident.

In fairness, presidents from Chen Shui-bian to Tsai Ing-wen, and now Lai Ching-te, have all extended gestures of goodwill toward the mainland, hoping for dialogue, negotiation, and exchanges. Yet, these gestures have gone unreciprocated under the DPP’s confrontational policy framework.

The DPP has been in power for nearly nine years and will continue to govern for at least three more. Amid frequent Taiwan Strait crises, it has doubled its anti-China messaging, using emotional mobilization to expand its electoral base—tactics that have proven effective in every presidential election.

Especially after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, both the DPP and Western strategic circles began drawing direct analogies between Ukraine and Taiwan. Hawkish former U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser Matt Pottinger called for turning the Taiwan Strait into a “boiling moat,” and U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo described a “hellish scenario.”

The United States urged Taiwan to prepare for urban warfare and asymmetric defense and to build a comprehensive national defense system—all of which the DPP embraced enthusiastically, further entrenching its confrontational stance.

Since Beijing adopted the policy of “peaceful unification and one country, two systems” as its core Taiwan policy, the military occupation of Taiwan has effectively been taken off the table.

“Peaceful unification” implies that the mainland must win over the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. Hence, the narrative is about “placing hope in the people of Taiwan” and promoting policies for dialogue and exchange.

“One Country, Two Systems” means that even post-unification, Taiwan would maintain a different system and be governed in its own way. The details of how this “one country” would be structured are also open to cross-strait negotiation.

Within this political framework, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military posture toward Taiwan serves only two purposes: First, prevent foreign occupation of Taiwan or a legal declaration of Taiwan independence (i.e., secession from China), which is defensive in nature.

Second, “use force to promote talks,” reminding Taiwanese political elites and the public that the cross-strait conflict remains unresolved and that only negotiations can guarantee peace and stability. Beijing’s aim in showcasing military strength is not conquest or occupation but a declaration of political intent.

Claims that the mainland seeks to invade or occupy Taiwan are fundamentally false. Even the PLA’s exercises in the Taiwan Strait are intended to pressure Taiwan back to the negotiating table under the “One China” framework. Vice Chairman Hsia’s remarks—that non-peaceful means have “no room for application”—precisely capture the profound logic behind Beijing’s Taiwan policy.

It also explains how cross-strait relations were able to develop peacefully and positively from the 2005 meeting between KMT Chairman Lien Chan and Hu Jintao to the 2015 meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping, with meaningful interaction across governments, parties, localities, and civil society.

The mainland has increased military pressure since the DPP returned to power in 2016. Unlike the 1990s, when the PLA conducted large-scale beach landing drills in response to President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States in 1995, recent exercises have shifted focus away from invasion to denying foreign intervention, disrupting Taiwan’s wartime logistics and blocking potential escape routes.

In other words, the mainland’s “last resort” plan appears to be high-pressure military strikes targeting Taiwan’s command structure to “force” cross-strait negotiations. But if it reached that point, how much bargaining power, confidence, or room for dialogue would Taiwan have left?

Indeed, Beijing employs a dual-track war and peace strategy—but military preparedness is meant to facilitate negotiations. The DPP, however, reverses the logic: it assumes military action is inevitable and uses that assumption to justify its own confrontational narrative and policy.

This creates a vicious cycle of escalating cross-strait hostility, making war increasingly likely as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20250501002915-262102?chdtv
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