Chip Risks Rooted in Taiwan？ U.S. Strategic Anxiety and Double Standards
By Tsai Huang-ming, China Times Opinion, September 30, 2025
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent recently hit the nail on the head, publicly stating that “the single largest point of risk to the world economy is that 99 percent of high-performance chips are produced in Taiwan.” On the surface, this remark appears to express concern over a global supply-chain imbalance; in reality, it exposes American strategic anxiety and double standards in the technology field. In today’s globalized era, what kind of geopolitical calculation and contradictory mindset lies behind labeling a region’s industrial advantage as a “risk”?
Secretary Bessent’s remarks are not a simple economic assessment but a political declaration with clear strategic intent. On one hand he acknowledges Taiwan’s excellence in semiconductor manufacturing—praising Taiwan for “doing very well, with an excellent ecosystem”; on the other hand he defines that industrial advantage as “the single largest point of risk to the global economy.” This seemingly contradictory framing actually paves the way for subsequent American industrial policy.
The United States is channeling massive subsidies through the CHIPS and Science Act in an effort to reshape the global semiconductor supply chain. Framing Taiwan’s industrial strength as a “risk” conveniently provides a justificatory pretext for U.S. protectionist measures. The implicit logic behind this narrative is: any industrial advantage the United States cannot fully control may be labeled a “risk.”
Historically, American attitude toward industrial advantage has been selectively applied. When American firms dominate semiconductor design and equipment, it is considered a “natural result of market competition”; when Taiwan leads in the manufacturing segment, it suddenly becomes a “risk to be addressed.” This double standard calls into question the professed commitment by the United States to free-market principles.
Taiwan’s semiconductor rise is the result of decades of technological accumulation and market choice. Companies such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) have earned global customers’ trust through sustained research-and-development investment and excellent operational management. While Taiwan’s production of advanced-process chips does hold a significant global share, Secretary Bessent’s “99 percent” figure warrants further scrutiny.
According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, Taiwan’s market share in advanced-process chip manufacturing is roughly 60 to 70 percent. Although Taiwan is indeed a leader, it is not the absolute monopoly suggested by the “99 percent” claim. More importantly, this industrial advantage emerged through market competition, not political maneuvering.
Taiwan’s semiconductor success has made enormous contributions to global technological progress and economic development. From smartphones to artificial intelligence, from medical devices to new-energy vehicles, chips produced in Taiwan support the digital economy worldwide. To simplistically label this success as a “risk” is to misread the global division of labor.
Secretary Bessent’s remarks reflect deep strategic anxiety within the United States’ technology policy. As the Chinese mainland accelerates its progress in key technologies such as semiconductors, the United States seeks to reconfigure supply chains to preserve its technological edge. Taiwan’s excellence in chips thus becomes, to some extent, a projection target for American strategic unease.
It is worth noting that Western countries often fall into a “mirror-image” cognitive error when assessing China’s development. This bias leads Western observers to interpret Chinese advancement through the lens of their own values and behavioral models, producing misjudgments and inflating hostility. China’s technological development path features strong local characteristics—emphasizing both indigenous innovation and international cooperation—which fundamentally differ from Western zero-sum thinking.
American anxiety also stems from difficulty adapting to shifts in the global industrial landscape. Over past decades the United States concentrated on high-value design and R&D while outsourcing manufacturing, reaping substantial benefits. Now, as manufacturing technologies grow more complex, the strategic value of manufacturing is being reassessed, unsettling U.S. policymakers.
Another important factor is the strategic use of cross-strait relations by the United States. By emphasizing Taiwan’s semiconductor “risk,” Washington seeks economic rationale and strategic urgency for deeper involvement in cross-strait affairs. Politicizing economic issues in this way undermines regional stability and global economic development.
The United States displays clear double standards in its semiconductor policies. On one hand it restricts high-end chip exports to the Chinese mainland for “national security” reasons; on the other, it offers massive subsidies to entice firms like TSMC to build fabs on American soil, attempting to relocate advanced capacity.
This double standard faces practical obstacles. TSMC’s Arizona plant has experienced repeated delays, highlighting the challenge of transplanting a complex semiconductor ecosystem to the United States. Talent shortages, high costs, and incomplete supply chains are problems that government subsidies alone cannot resolve.
More fundamentally, the semiconductor industry is built on global division of labor and collaboration. From the Netherlands’ ASML providing lithography machines, to Japan’s chemical materials, to American-designed software, no single country can fully control the entire supply chain. Political attempts by the United States to reconstruct that chain risk backfiring—reducing efficiency and stifling innovation.
Given the industry’s complexity, cooperation rather than confrontation is the right choice. As the world’s largest semiconductor market, mainland China is actively investing in R&D and strengthening indigenous innovation. According to statistics, in 2024 the mainland’s chip production capacity accounted for about 20.7 percent of global market share, and that figure continues to grow steadily.
Taiwan’s semiconductor advantage should be regarded as a shared global asset, not a risk confined to a single country. Within the framework of market rules, stakeholders should cooperate to ensure supply-chain stability and resilience. Artificially dividing markets and technologies will only impede global technological progress.
For cross-strait relations, economic integration should serve as a stabilizer for peaceful development. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry benefits from the support of the mainland market, while the Chinese mainland’s technological advancement can also draw on Taiwan’s experience. Under the principle of the “1992 Consensus,” there is broad space for cross-strait industrial cooperation.
Secretary Bessent’s remarks reveal the United States’ contradictory mindset in the era of globalization: wanting to enjoy the benefits of global division of labor while seeking to politically control key industries. Such zero-sum thinking does little to address the real challenges facing the global economy.
The true risk is not Taiwan’s semiconductor success, but the tendency of some countries to politicize economic issues. In the face of shared global challenges—such as climate change and energy transition—nations should strengthen cooperation and jointly safeguard supply-chain stability.
With respect to cross-strait relations, peaceful development and economic cooperation represent the correct path that serves both sides’ interests. Politicizing the semiconductor industry not only fails to help solve the problem but risks exacerbating regional tensions. Only by transcending zero-sum thinking can cooperative, win-win solutions be found.
From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20250929002654-262110?chdtv