CSIS Wargame May Be Missing the Point

By Lo Ching-sheng

China Times, January 12, 2023

 

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently conducted a military simulation of a mainland Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026. Their predicted result was the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was defeated, and the allied forces of Taiwan, the U.S., and Japan were victorious.

 

The simulation estimates that 10,000 people from the PLA will be killed, and 155 fighter planes and 138 large ships will be destroyed. Two U.S. aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface warships will sink into the waters, and 3,500 U.S. troops will be killed. Japan, which participated in the simulation war, will lose more than 100 fighter planes and 26 ships. Taiwan’s army would suffer 3,500 casualties, and all 26 destroyers and frigates will sink.

 

This is not the first time that CSIS has conducted a military simulation for the Taiwan Strait, but this is the most extensive one. Under the title the "First Battle of the Next War," they simulated 24 battle situations, highlighting the persuasiveness of the conclusions of their military simulation. CSIS is an important think tank in Washington, and it is understandable that this report has a significant impact on the decision-making process of the U.S. Federal government and Congress.

 

But because this simulation is very important, it is worrisome that the United States may have gotten the focus wrong. Western-style linear thinking does not take into account the Asian strategic culture. The Chinese have always admired reverse thinking. CSIS bases its assumptions on the PLA’s attack on Taiwan and the rejection of U.S. and Japanese military intervention. However, this approach, which the PLA calls "blocking support and managing points," is not necessarily the option. If the PLA only besieges and does not attack Taiwan but instead goes all out to attack the U.S. military, what will the United States do?

 

In the military simulation report, CSIS indicates that they reached the conclusion of the U.S. military's final victory based on four premises. Including the beachhead established by Taiwan's ground forces to contain the PLA's landing, the U.S. military's ability to use American military bases stationed in Japan to carry out combat missions, the U.S. military's long-range anti-ship missiles capable of attacking PLA ships from a distance, and the United States fully arming Taiwan before going to war and without hesitation send troops to intervene in any conflict that breaks out across the Taiwan Strait.

 

Under such assumptions, what the PLA has to deal with is the allied forces of Taiwan, the United States, and Japan. The national army is estimated to be at around 200,000 people after the extension of compulsory service; the U.S. military in the Pacific includes five aircraft carrier battle groups, two Marine Corps expeditionary units, and four air force air teams with a total of more than 260,000 people; the Japanese Self-Defense Forces has 250,000 people. In this case, the PLA has to face more than 700,000 troops.

 

If the PLA crosses the waters to attack Taiwan, they will not only have to fight the most risky sea crossing operation, but also fight the most manpower-intensive landing operation; in this way, at least 1 million troops are needed in order to have a chance of winning. The total strength of the PLA is only 2 million. Will Communist China put all its eggs in one basket and use half of its total military force to attack Taiwan regardless of other defense needs? If they do, then they are not thinking clearly.

 

After further calculation, we know that CSIS's simulation is not correct, and the parameter settings are wrong. If the PLA forcibly attacks Taiwan, and then fights with the U.S. and Japanese allied forces afterwards, the estimate that 10,000 people would be killed is too optimistic. It would be a much larger number, over 100,000. 

 

CSIS's simulation is too one sided, and the expected results are formed from continuous assumptions. The entire "victory formula" is to assume that someone first exhausts a large number of PLA troops, and then the U.S. military will win the final victory. Just like in World War II, the U.S. military entered Europe as a new force after Britain and France had exhausted the German troops. But this is too obvious in the strategic layout of the Taiwan Strait. Let’s not forget to mention whether the Taiwanese are willing to sacrifice themselves to achieve American hegemony; the PLA is not dumb, and will not take such a big risk and adopt this suicidal approach.

 

A better option for Communist China in using force is to use a "siege the point and attack aid" to restrain the national army and mainly attack the U.S. and Japanese reinforcements. This way, the 200,000 troops of the national army can be limited to Taiwan Island, as long as the 500,000 American and Japanese allied forces are targeted. And will Japan send troops to cooperate with the U.S. military? It is still unknown.

 

If Japan hesitates, the PLA only needs to deal with 260,000 U.S. troops in the Pacific. The more than 30,000 U.S. troops deployed in Ryukyu and Guam in this way are equivalent to hostages; the PLA will take advantage of the home field and wait for the U.S. troops rushing from thousands of kilometers away in Hawaii and the west coast of the United States.

 

Why does Biden insist on building guardrails when he pushes "U.S.-China competition"?

 

In fact, war is a complex system. Once it breaks out, the subsequent development is unpredictable. The CSIS military simulation deviates from reality, but the conclusion is unquestionable, that is, both sides will suffer. This is the interesting thing about complex systems. We can't predict how the process will change, but no matter how it changes, the result will be the same.

 

This should be the reason why the Biden administration has repeatedly emphasized the need to establish "guardrails" when promoting "U.S.-China competition." At the summit in Bali in November of last year, when Biden met with Xi Jinping, he still stated that the United States will continue to compete fiercely with China, but this competition should not turn into a conflict.

 

As a hegemony, why does the United States refuse to deal with the challenge of China's rise through military conflict when it still has an absolute advantage in military strength? The most reasonable reason is the fear of losing both sides. In this way, even if the United States wins, its hegemony will be surrendered, which may eventually benefit the European Union, the United Kingdom, and even Japan.

 

American elites understand that the establishment of their hegemony is based on the vicious struggle of the European powers for more than 100 years. If it weren't for Britain, France, Germany, Russia and other countries fighting each other endlessly, so that all parties were exhausted in the end, it would not be the United States’ turn.

 

But even if the U.S. does not want to fight, can it stop the increasingly powerful PLA from wanting to fight?

 

Although the United States has the most powerful military force and the most advanced military technology in the world, much is outdated, and as time goes by, it becomes more and more old. It is an impossible task to update more than 10,000 fighter planes and more than 200 large warships within 20 years. Although the PLA is inexperienced, with their modern equipment and time, they will become more and more experienced, and stronger. Who the ultimate winner is, nobody knows.

 

Therefore, strategists in Taiwan must get rid of the outdated thinking that the conflict in the Taiwan Strait is a continuation of the civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party, and use the framework of "U.S.-China competition" to understand the possible future war in the Taiwan Strait. If the United States really designed it as the "first battle of the next war" as the title of the CSIS event, then whoever makes Taiwan a ruin in the first battle will be a sinner in Taiwan's history.

 

The outcome of the "U.S.-China competition" drama remains uncertain, and Taiwan must stay strong. Only a politician who can withstand the pressure of all parties is qualified to be the president of the Republic of China and lead everyone through danger. One principle remains unchanged, that is: The one who can survive until the end is the winner.

 

From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20230112001520-262110?chdtv

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