Trump's Mention of "Unification and Peace" Not to be Taken lightly
By Huang Kwei-bo, United Daily News, May 14, 2025
After the U.S.-China talks in Geneva concluded, former President Donald Trump stated at a White House press conference that the discussions went smoothly, were mutually beneficial, and were "very conducive to unification and peace." The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration seems to have been overly dismissive of this, relying on a rigid "assume the worst of the adversary" mindset—one that excludes many potential variables. It would be better to reassess the event itself and adopt a broader and more flexible approach in analyzing potential threats.
The DPP administration, citing official U.S. statements, claimed that Taiwan-related issues were not discussed during the U.S.-China trade negotiations—just as it has said that recent U.S.-Taiwan economic and trade talks did not touch on the New Taiwan Dollar exchange rate. However, considering the recent sharp appreciation of the NT dollar—highest in East Asia—and the South Korean central bank governor's statement that the United States discussed exchange rates with several East Asian countries, how many people would truly believe those denials?
Why did Mr. Trump bring up "unification and peace" during trade talks? A likely explanation is that he was briefed by his staff that Chinese officials had requested U.S. support for peaceful unification. Whether he said it unintentionally or genuinely thought it was feasible, the fact is—he said it.
The DPP administration should be aware that both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi have previously stated that the United States should support peaceful unification across the Taiwan Strait. Thus, it’s not surprising if Chinese officials raised this as a political condition in negotiations. However, if that indeed happened, the U.S. officials’ responses remain unknown.
The DPP administration appears to accept the public statements from the U.S. Department of State and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) that Taiwan was not involved in the talks—thus choosing to downplay Mr. Trump's comments. Interestingly, when President Biden said at least four times that the United States would defend or militarily intervene in Taiwan’s defense, his officials would later clarify that the U.S. “One China” policy had not changed. Yet many in the DPP still chose to believe Joe Biden, ignoring the clarifications from his administration. When one’s preferences lead to selective hearing and interpretation, it’s easy to fall into a “worst-case thinking” trap that is actually overly optimistic.
Furthermore, the DPP should recall that in March 2017, Mr. Trump’s first Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Beijing and unexpectedly accepted the PRC's concept of a “new type of great power relations”—a notion China had been trying to sell to the United States since 2012, but which the United States had never formally endorsed. While he avoided the specific phrase, the core concepts of “no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation” came straight from his mouth. Then-acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Susan Thornton, when explaining the One China policy, omitted the “Six Assurances” and said future U.S.-China dialogue would “not be a problem.” At the time, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council reacted with unease, urging the United States to uphold the Taiwan Relations Act and its commitments to Taiwan, emphasizing that Taiwan should not become a bargaining chip.
This marked a sharp policy reversal after Mr. Trump had previously questioned the One China policy, accused Beijing of currency manipulation, and threatened high tariffs on Chinese goods. Yet just one month later, in April 2017, Mr. Trump met with Mr. Xi at Mar-a-Lago. This sequence is strikingly similar to recent events: Mr. Trump initially takes a hard stance against China, then softens, compromises, and ultimately signs a joint statement, even casually mentioning peaceful unification and hinting at a possible phone call with Mr. Xi in the coming days.
Later, negotiations between the two sides encountered ups and downs, with continuous friction. The outbreak of the pandemic led Mr. Trump to blame China and criticize its failure to honor the Phase One trade deal, further hindering his administration. As a result, Mr. Trump made no further compromises on Taiwan policy. If, at the time, then-President Tsai Ing-wen’s national security team had assumed things were fine, without any favorable shifts in the situation afterward, it’s hard to imagine how much damage could have been done to Taiwan’s dignity and national interest.
Past lessons must guide future actions. When Mr. Trump suddenly mentioned that the talks were “very conducive to unification and peace,” yet the DPP administration responded with a mere shrug, it’s hard to feel reassured or believe that the issue is truly so simple. For the well-being and livelihood of the people of Taiwan, the Republic of China, we sincerely hope to see a central administration that demonstrates high-level strategic vigilance and dares to engage in dialogue with the United States from a position of safeguarding the interests of its people.