Lai's Position Under U.S.-China Joint Management

By Su Yong-lin

China Times, May 02, 2024

 

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink recently stated in a hearing at the House of Representatives that the United States has explicitly informed Beijing not to escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait around May 20. Kritenbrink also characterized President-elect William Lai’s post-election statements as "highly responsible." Kritenbrink expressed confidence in Lai and urged Beijing to avoid provocation, contradicting rumors of suspicion surrounding Lai. This reflects a high level of confidence of the United States in monitoring and controlling Lai's actions and statements.

 

Before the Taiwan presidential election on January 13 this year, both domestic and international public opinion keenly noted Washington's subtle and cautious attitude towards Lai, fearing that he might become the next Chen Shui-bian, a former president sympathetic to Taiwan independence. Particularly, when he mentioned "entering the White House," the United States immediately requested clarification through diplomatic channels, and subsequently, several scholars urged Lai to provide "reassurances" on issues like Taiwan independence. Similarly, after Lai's election, Chairperson Laura Rosenberger of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) visited Taiwan twice and clearly stated in public that the new government must commit to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

 

However, there has been a "shift in tone" recently, as seen from Kritenbrink's highly positive remarks about Lai’s statements post-election. This shift can be perceived as containing valuable information. First, Lai has completely avoided mentioning Taiwan independence after the election, which is reassuring to the United States. Furthermore, it can be inferred that the United States likely has a good grasp of Lai's inauguration speech on May 20 and expects Lai not to mention any references to "Taiwan independence." Behind this, there may be an unspoken agreement: Lai pledges not to openly discuss Taiwan's independence or Taiwan’s status as a sovereign nation, in exchange for the United States refraining from pressuring or urging the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to abolish the "Taiwan independence” party charter. Consequently, the "Taiwan independence” party charter becomes a card that the United States can use to continue negotiations with Beijing.

 

Furthermore, Lai has repeatedly advocated for cross-strait exchanges and dialogue after the election, including proposing concepts such as "dialogue between ruling parties across the strait" and "China should face a democratically elected legitimate government," all of which align with the longstanding Taiwan Strait policy of the United States. Compared to mainland China's insistence on certain political foundations for resuming official dialogue across the strait, the United States does not pre-set conditions for cross-strait dialogue and has always welcomed "peaceful resolution of Taiwan Strait disputes.” Neither does America pressure the DPP to accept the "1992 Consensus." In other words, after May 20, if mainland China continues its approach towards Taiwan as during President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, the United States is likely to exert pressure on Beijing instead of on Lai.

 

Additionally, there have been active signs of grassroots-level cross-strait exchanges after the election, which is clearly welcomed by the United States. For instance, mainland Chinese local officials and school principals have visited Taiwan, while figures like former President Ma Ying-jeou and Legislator Fu Kun-chi, convener of the KMT caucus of the Legislative Yuan, have visited mainland China. From the American perspective, these interactions indicate that China has no immediate intention of resorting to military measures against Taiwan. Conversely, even though there were disagreements domestically post-election, Speaker Han Kuo-yu Legislative Yuan has stated to the United States that “the government and opposition parties are united in national defense and diplomacy.” This allows the United States to assess that it retains leadership in the short term. In essence, as long as Beijing promotes grassroots exchanges across the strait, whether with the ruling party or the opposition, the United States will view it as an "effective deterrent," which is one of the reasons that Kritenbrink believes the United States has no intention of changing its Taiwan Strait policy.

 

Kritenbrink's visit to Beijing following that of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, along with his meeting with Deputy Director Chiu Kai-ming of the Taiwan Affairs Office of mainland China’s State Council signifies direct and in-depth communication between the United States and China regarding Lai’s May 20 inaugural address. It is noteworthy that during Blinken's visit to China, both sides did not heavily emphasize Taiwan-related issues, indicating that this aspect falls under "disagreements that have been properly managed." It can be anticipated that Lai will not mention Taiwan independence or use terms leaning towards Beijing during the inauguration ceremony on May 20. The triangular relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan during the Tsai administration is unlikely to undergo significant changes but may see minor improvements.

 

From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20240502004699-262104?chdtv

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